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Abstract
In [11], Kalai investigated the probability of a rational outcome for a generalized social
welfare function (GSWF) on three alternatives, when the individual preferences are uniform
and independent. In this paper we generalize Kalai’s results to a broader class of distri-
butions of the individual preferences, and obtain new lower bounds on the probability of a
rational outcome in several classes of GSWFs. In particular, we show that if the GSWF is
monotone and balanced and the distribution of the preferences is uniform, then the proba-
bility of a rational outcome is at least 3/4, proving a conjecture raised by Kalai. The tools
used in the paper are analytic: the Fourier-Walsh expansion of Boolean functions on the
discrete cube, properties of the Bonamie-Beckner noise operator, and the FKG inequality.
1 Introduction
Consider a situation in which a society of n members selects a ranking amongst m alternatives.
In the election process, each member of the society gives a ranking of the alternatives (the
ranking is a full linear ordering; that is, indifference between alternatives is not allowed). The
set of the rankings given by the individual members is called a profile. Given the profile, the
ranking of the society is determined according to some function, called a generalized social
welfare function (GSWF).
The GSWF is a function F : Ln → {0, 1}(m2 ), where L is the set of linear orderings on
m elements. In other words, given the profile consisting of linear orderings supplied by the
voters, the function determines the preference of the society amongst each of the
(m
2
)
pairs of
alternatives. If the output of F can be represented as a full linear ordering of them alternatives,
then F is called a social welfare function (SWF).
Throughout this paper we consider GSWFs satisfying the Independence of Irrelevant Alter-
natives (IIA) condition: For every two alternatives A and B, the preference of the entire society
between A and B depends only on the preference of each individual voter between A and B.
This natural condition on GSWFs can be traced back to Condorcet [5].
The Condorcet’s paradox demonstrates that if the number of alternatives is at least three
and the GSWF is based on the majority rule between every pair of alternatives, then there exist
∗This research is supported by the Adams Fellowship Program of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Human-
ities.
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Figure 1: The Alternatives and the Choice Functions
profiles for which the voting procedure cannot yield a full order relation. That is, there exist
alternatives A,B, and C, such that the majority of the society prefers A over B, the majority
prefers B over C, and the majority prefers C over A. Such situation is called irrational choice
of the society. Arrow’s impossibility theorem [1] asserts that if a GSWF on at least three
alternatives satisfies the IIA condition, has all the possible orderings of the alternatives in its
range, and is not a dictatorship (that is, the preference of the society is not determined by a
single member), then there exists a profile for which the choice of the society is irrational.
Since the existence of profiles leading to an irrational choice has significant implications on
voting procedures, an extensive research has been conducted in order to evaluate the probability
of irrational choice for various GSWFs. Most of the results in this area are summarized in [9].
In addition to its significance in Social Choice theory, this area of research leads to interesting
questions in probabilistic and extremal combinatorics (see [16]).
In 2002, Kalai [11] suggested an analytic approach to this study. He showed that for
GSWFs on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition, the probability of irrational choice
can be computed by a formula related to the Fourier-Walsh expansion of the GSWF. Using this
formula he presented a new proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem under additional assumption
of neutrality and established upper bounds on the probability of irrational choice for specific
classes of GSWFs.
In this paper we generalize the results of [11] in several directions. As in [11], we focus on
GSWFs on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition. We denote the alternatives by A,B,
and C, and the choice functions amongst the pairs (A,B), (B,C), and (C,A) by f, g, and h,
respectively (see Figure 1).
We examine GSWFs satisfying (some of) the following conditions:
• Balance - A GSWF is balanced if the choice functions f, g, and h are balanced (i.e., satisfy
E[f ] = E[g] = E[h] = 1/2).
• Neutrality - A GSWF is neutral if it is invariant under permutations of the alternatives.
In particular, this implies that the choice functions satisfy f = g = h, and that f is
balanced.
• Symmetry - We call a GSWF symmetric if it is invariant under a transitive group of
permutations of the voters. In particular, this implies that the choice functions are far
from a dictatorship.1
1Note that this definition of symmetry is much weaker than the usual definition requiring that the func-
tion depends only on the Hamming weight of the input. Important classes of functions, including the tribes
functions [3], satisfy our definition of symmetry.
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• Monotonicity - A GSWF is monotone if the choice functions f, g, and h are monotone
increasing.2
The first direction in our paper is a generalization of the possible distributions of the indi-
vidual preferences. In [11] it is assumed that the individual preferences are independent and
uniformly distributed. We show that the results of [11] are valid (under some modifications)
also for non-uniform distributions of the preferences, as long as the voters are independent, and
for each ordering of the alternatives, the probability of the ordering is equal to the probability
of the inverse ordering. We call such distributions even product distributions. In particular, we
prove the following generalization of Theorem 5.1 of [11]:
Theorem 1.1. Consider a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition. If the
distribution of the preferences is an even product distribution such that the probability of each
preference is positive, and the GSWF is neutral and symmetric, then the probability of irrational
choice is bounded away from zero, independently of the number of the voters.3
The second direction is obtaining new lower bounds on the probability of a rational choice
for several classes of GSWFs. In particular, we prove the following conjecture raised in [11]:
Theorem 1.2. Consider a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition. If the
individual preferences are independent and uniformly distributed, and the GSWF is monotone
and balanced, then the probability of a rational choice is at least 3/4.
The proof of this result relies on properties of the Bonamie-Beckner noise operator and uses
the FKG inequality [7]. Furthermore, we establish a generalization of Theorem 1.2 to even
product distributions of the individual preferences.
Finally, we consider the stability version of Arrow’s theorem presented in [11]. This version
asserts that if a balanced GSWF on three alternatives satisfies the IIA condition and is at least
ǫ-far from being a dictatorship, then it leads to irrational choice with probability at least C · ǫ,
for a universal constant C. Kalai asked whether his proof technique can be extended to an
analytic proof of Arrow’s theorem without the neutrality assumption, or even to a stability
version of Arrow’s theorem. (Such version would assert that for any ǫ > 0, there exists δ = δ(ǫ)
such that if a GSWF on at least three candidates satisfies the IIA condition and is at least δ-far
from being a dictatorship and from not having all the orderings of the alternatives in its range,
then the probability of irrational choice is at least ǫ.)
We show that the neutrality assumption cannot be dropped completely from Kalai’s re-
sult, that is, there does not exist a stability version of Arrow’s theorem (with no additional
assumptions) in which the dependence of δ(ǫ) on ǫ is linear.
Theorem 1.3. For all ǫ,K > 0 and n = n(ǫ,K) big enough, there exists a GSWF on three
alternatives satisfying the IIA condition, such that:
1. Amongst any pair of alternatives, the probability of each alternative to be preferred by the
society over the other alternative is at least η = 2−ǫn/(n + 1).
2. The probability of an irrational choice is less than η/K.
2The definition of a monotone increasing function on the discrete cube is given is Section 4.
3In the context of this theorem, “bounded away” means that the probability is greater than a constant,
depending only on the distribution of the preferences, and not on the number of voters and the choice functions.
Theorem 5.1 in [11] states that if the preferences are distributed uniformly, then the value of this constant is at
least 0.0808.
3
The example that proves Theorem 1.3 is a GSWF on three alternatives in which the choice
functions f, g, and h are threshold functions (i.e., (f(x) = 1)⇔ (∑ni=1 xi ≥ k) ), with expecta-
tions η, 1/2, and 1− η.
After this paper was written, a stability version of Arrow’s theorem without additional
assumptions was proved by Mossel [18]. In Mossel’s theorem, the dependence of δ on ǫ is
δ = m2 ·exp(C/ǫ21) for a universal constant C, wherem is the number of alternatives. Recently,
Keller [13] showed that the stability version holds for δ ≈ Cm2 · ǫ8/9 where C is a universal
constant. Moreover, Keller showed that for small values of ǫ, the example presented above (i.e.,
the threshold functions) is almost optimal: its probability of irrational choice is greater than
the lower bound at most by a logarithmic factor (in ǫ).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we recall some basic properties of the Fourier-
Walsh expansion of functions on the discrete cube and of the Bonamie-Beckner noise operator.
In Section 3 we generalize the results of [11] to even product distributions of the preferences
and prove Theorem 1.1. In Section 4 we establish lower bounds on the probability of a rational
choice for several classes of GSWFs and prove Theorem 1.2. In Section 5 we discuss Kalai’s
stability version of Arrow’s theorem and prove Theorem 1.3.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Fourier-Walsh Expansion of Functions on the Discrete Cube
Consider the discrete cube {0, 1}n endowed with the uniform measure µ. Denote the set of all
real-valued functions on the discrete cube by X. The inner product of functions f, g ∈ X is
defined as usual as
〈f, g〉 = Eµ[fg] = 1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
f(x)g(x).
This inner product induces a norm on X:
||f ||2 =
√
〈f, f〉 =
√
Eµ[f2].
Consider the Rademacher functions {ri}ni=1, defined as:
ri(x1, . . . , xn) = 2xi − 1.
These functions constitute an orthonormal system in X. Moreover, this system can be com-
pleted to an orthonormal basis in X by defining
rS =
∏
i∈S
ri,
for all S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}. Every function f ∈ X can be represented by its Fourier expansion with
respect to the system {rS}S⊂{1,...,n}:
f =
∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
〈f, rS〉rS .
This representation is called the Fourier-Walsh expansion of f . The coefficients in this expansion
are denoted by
fˆ(S) = 〈f, rS〉,
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and the level of the coefficient fˆ(S) is |S|.
By the Parseval identity, for all f ∈ X,∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
fˆ(S)2 = ||f ||22.
More generally, for all f, g ∈ X,
〈f, g〉 =
∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
fˆ(S)gˆ(S).
Following [11], we will be also interested in a biased version of the inner product, defined as
follows:
Definition 2.1. Let f, g be two real-valued functions on the discrete cube, and let −1 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
Define
〈〈f, g〉〉δ =
∑
S 6=∅
fˆ(S)gˆ(S)δ|S|.
Note that this definition slightly differs from the definition used in [11]. Finally, we note that
for all f ∈ X,
fˆ(∅) = 〈f, r∅〉 = Eµ[f · 1] = Eµ[f ].
2.2 The Bonamie-Beckner Noise Operator
The noise operator, introduced in [4, 2], is defined in terms of the Fourier-Walsh expansion as
follows:
Definition 2.2. Consider a function f on the discrete cube with a Fourier-Walsh expansion
f =
∑
S fˆ(S)rS. For 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, the noise operator Tǫ applied to f is
Tǫf =
∑
S
ǫ|S|fˆ(S)rS . (1)
It is well-known that one can arrive from f to Tǫf by the following process: For any x ∈ {0, 1}n,
Tǫf(x) = E[f(x⊕ y)], (2)
where ⊕ denotes coordinate-wise addition modulo 2, and each coordinate of y is chosen inde-
pendently according to the distribution Pr[yi = 0] = (1 + ǫ)/2,Pr[yi = 1] = (1 − ǫ)/2. That
is, each coordinate of x is left unchanged with probability ǫ and is replaced by a random value
with probability 1 − ǫ, and then f is evaluated on the result. Thus, Tǫf represents a noisy
variant of f , and for this reason Tǫf is called “the noise operator”.
As pointed out by the anonymous referee, the noise operator can be defined in the same way
(i.e., by Equation 1) also for −1 ≤ ǫ ≤ 0. Moreover, it can be easily shown that the basic
property of the noise operator described above (i.e., Equation 2) also translates to the case
−1 ≤ ǫ ≤ 0. That is, we still have
Tǫf(x) = E[f(x⊕ y)],
where each coordinate of y is chosen independently according to the distribution Pr[yi = 0] =
(1 + ǫ)/2,Pr[yi = 1] = (1 − ǫ)/2. Using this observation, we shall consider the noise operator
for −1 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1.
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3 The Probability of Rational Choice for a Non-Uniform Dis-
tribution of the Preferences
Throughout the paper we assume that the number of alternatives is three and denote the
alternatives by A,B, and C. Since (by assumption) the GSWF satisfies the IIA condition, the
preference of the society between every pair of alternatives can be represented by a Boolean
function on the discrete cube. Formally, given a profile, we consider the pair of alternatives
(A,B) and construct a binary vector (x1, . . . , xn) such that xi = 1 if the i-th voter prefers A
over B, and xi = 0 if the i-th voter prefers B over A. We set f(x1, . . . , xn) = 1 if the entire
society prefers A over B and f(x1, . . . , xn) = 0 if the society prefers B over A. Note that
the preference of the society between A and B is determined by (x1, . . . , xn), and hence f is
well-defined. Similarly, we define the Boolean functions g and h that represent the preferences
between the pairs (B,C) and (C,A), respectively (see Figure 1).
Every profile is uniquely represented by the binary vector (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zn),
where (xi, yi, zi) represent the preferences of the i-th voter between (A,B), (B,C), and (C,A).
We assume that the vectors (xi, yi, zi) for different values of i are independent (i.e., the prefer-
ences of the individual voters are independent), and that these vectors do not assume the values
(0, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 1) (since otherwise the preferences of the i-th voter do not constitute an order
relation). In [11], the distribution over the six possible values of (xi, yi, zi) was assumed to be
uniform. In our analysis, we consider the following distribution:
Pr[(xi, yi, zi) = (1, 1, 0)] = α Pr[(xi, yi, zi) = (0, 1, 1)] = β Pr[(xi, yi, zi) = (1, 0, 1)] = γ
Pr[(xi, yi, zi) = (0, 0, 1)] = α Pr[(xi, yi, zi) = (1, 0, 0)] = β Pr[(xi, yi, zi) = (0, 1, 0)] = γ,
where α+β+ γ = 1/2. We call this distribution an even product distribution, and denote it by
D(α, β, γ). The intuition behind the restrictions will be explained at the end of this section.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition where the
choice functions between the pairs of alternatives (A,B), (B,C), and (C,A) are f, g, and h,
respectively. If the distribution of the individual preferences is an even product distribution
D(α, β, γ), as described above, then the probability of irrational choice is given by the formula:
W (f, g, h) = p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3) + 〈〈f, g〉〉4α−1 + 〈〈g, h〉〉4β−1 + 〈〈h, f〉〉4γ−1, (3)
where p1, p2, and p3 are the expectations of f, g, and h, respectively.
Remark 3.2. Theorem 3.1 generalizes Theorem 3.1 of [11], which corresponds to the case
α = β = γ = 1/6.
Proof: For a profile (x, y, z) = (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zn), the choice of the society is
rational if and only if
f(x)g(y)h(z) + (1− f(x))(1− g(y))(1 − h(z)) = 0.
Therefore, the probability of irrational choice is
W (f, g, h) =
∑
(x,y,z)∈{0,1}3n
Pr[(x, y, z)]
(
f(x)g(y)h(z) + (1− f(x))(1 − g(y))(1 − h(z))
)
,
where Pr[(x, y, z)] =
∏
iPr[(xi, yi, zi)], according to the distribution D(α, β, γ).
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Consider the functions F1, F2, F3 : {0, 1}3n → R defined by
F1(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zn) = f(x)g(y)h(z),
F2(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zn) = (1− f(x))(1 − g(y))(1 − h(z)),
F3(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zn) = Pr[(x, y, z)].
We have
W (f, g, h) = 23n〈F3, F1 + F2〉,
and hence by the Parseval identity,
W (f, g, h) = 23n
∑
S⊂{1,...,3n}
Fˆ3(S)(Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S)). (4)
Therefore, in order to compute the probability of rational choice it is sufficient to compute the
Fourier-Walsh expansions of F1, F2, and F3.
In order to compute the expansions, we use the fact that if a function is a multiplication
of functions on disjoint sets of variables, then its Fourier-Walsh expansion also has the same
structure. Hence, if we denote S = (S1, S2, S3), where S1 represents (x1, . . . , xn), S2 represents
(y1, . . . , yn), and S3 represents (z1, . . . , zn), then
Fˆ1(S) = fˆ(S1)gˆ(S2)hˆ(S3) and Fˆ2(S) = 1̂− f(S1)1̂− g(S2)1̂− h(S3).
Similarly, since the individual preferences are independent, the Fourier-Walsh expansion of F3
is determined by the Fourier-Walsh expansion of the functions F i4 : {0, 1}3 → R defined by
F i4((xi, yi, zi)) = Pr[(xi, yi, zi)].
This expansion (presented below) can be found by direct computation.
Fˆ i4(∅) = 1/8, Fˆ i4({1}) = 0, Fˆ i4({2}) = 0, Fˆ i4({3}) = 0, Fˆ i4({1, 2}) = (4α − 1)/8,
Fˆ i4({2, 3}) = (4β − 1)/8, Fˆ i4({1, 3}) = (4γ − 1)/8, Fˆ i4({1, 2, 3}) = 0.
Since the Fourier-Walsh coefficients of F3 are multiplications of the corresponding coefficients of
{F i4}ni=1, we have Fˆ3(S) = 0, unless S = (S1, S2, S3) has a special structure: Each 1 ≤ i ≤ n is
contained in either none or two of the sets (S1, S2, S3). For such special sets S, the coefficients
are given by the formula
Fˆ3(S) =
(1
8
)t1(4α− 1
8
)t2(4β − 1
8
)t3(4γ − 1
8
)t4
,
where
t1 = the number of triples (xi, yi, zi) equal to (0, 0, 0),
t2 = the number of triples (xi, yi, zi) equal to (1, 1, 0),
t3 = the number of triples (xi, yi, zi) equal to (0, 1, 1),
t4 = the number of triples (xi, yi, zi) equal to (1, 0, 1).
Finally, we note that by the linearity of the Fourier transform, we have fˆ(S1) = −(1̂− f(S1))
for all S1 6= ∅, and the same for g and h. Therefore, if S1, S2, S3 6= ∅, then
Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S) = 0.
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Combining the observations above, we get that the term
Fˆ3(S)(Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S))
vanishes unless S = (S1, S2, S3) has the following special structure: At least one of S1, S2, S3 is
empty, and each i is contained in either none or two of S1, S2, S3.
Assume that S3 = ∅, and thus S1 = S2 (otherwise, there exists i that is contained in only
one of the sets S1, S2, S3, and hence Fˆ3(S)(Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S)) = 0). Assume also that S1 6= ∅. We
note that 1̂− h(∅) = 1− hˆ(∅), and hence by the calculations above,
Fˆ3(S)(Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S)) =
(1
8
)n−|S1|(4α− 1
8
)|S1|
fˆ(S1)gˆ(S1) =
(1
8
)n
(4α− 1)|S1|fˆ(S1)gˆ(S1).
If S1 = S2 = S3 = ∅, then
Fˆ3(S)(Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S)) = (1/8)
n(p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1 − p3)).
Therefore, summing over all the possible values of S we get∑
S⊂{1,...,3n}
Fˆ3(S)(Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S)) = (1/8)
n
(
p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1 − p3)+
+
∑
S1 6=∅
(4α − 1)|S1|fˆ(S1)gˆ(S1) +
∑
S2 6=∅
(4β − 1)|S2|gˆ(S2)hˆ(S2) +
∑
S3 6=∅
(4γ − 1)|S3|fˆ(S3)hˆ(S3)
)
=
= (1/8)n
(
p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1 − p2)(1− p3) + 〈〈f, g〉〉4α−1 + 〈〈g, h〉〉4β−1 + 〈〈h, f〉〉4γ−1
)
,
and thus the assertion of the theorem follows from Equation (4). 
Using Theorem 3.1, some of the results of [11] and [16] can be generalized to even product
distributions of the preferences. We present here two of the results.
Theorem 3.3. Consider a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition. If the
distribution of the preferences is an even product distribution D(α, β, γ) and the GSWF is
neutral and symmetric, then the probability of an irrational choice satisfies the inequality
W (f, g, h) ≥ (1
4
− dm)(1 + (4α− 1)3 + (4β − 1)3 + (4γ − 1)3) > 0, (5)
where dm ≈ 1/(2π) is the sum of squares of the first-level Fourier-Walsh coefficients of the
majority function. In particular, W (f, g, h) is bounded away from zero.
Remark 3.4. Theorem 3.3 generalizes Theorem 5.1 in [11], which corresponds to the case
α = β = γ = 1/6.
In the proof of Theorem 3.3 we use the following technical lemma, obtained with the assistance
of Tomer Schlank.
Lemma 3.5. For any integer k ≥ 1, and all −1 ≤ x, y, z ≤ 1 such that x+ y + z = 1, we have
x3 + y3 + z3 ≥ x2k+1 + y2k+1 + z2k+1. (6)
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Proof: Denote D = {(x, y, z) ∈ [−1, 1]3|x + y + z = 1}, and f(x, y, z) = (x3 + y3 + z3) −
(x2k+1 + y2k+1 + z2k+1). Since D is compact and f is continuous, f obtains a minimum in
D. We would like to show that minD(f) = 0. First, we note that f is identically zero on the
boundary of D. Indeed, if (x, y, z) ∈ ∂(D), then w.l.o.g., either x = −1 and then necessarily
y = z = 1, or x = 1 and then y = −z. In both cases, f(x, y, z) = 0. If f attains its minimum
in an internal point (x0, y0, z0) ∈ D, then by Lagrange multipliers, we have
3x20 − (2k + 1)x2k0 = 3y20 − (2k + 1)y2k0 = 3z20 − (2k + 1)z2k0 .
If |x0| 6= |y0|, the first equality is equivalent to:
3
2k + 1
=
x2k0 − y2k0
x20 − y20
=
k−1∑
l=0
(x20)
l(y20)
k−1−l, (7)
and similarly for the pairs (x0, z0) and (y0, z0). For a given x0, the function
∑k−1
l=0 (x
2
0)
l(y20)
k−1−l
is increasing as function of y20. Hence, Equation (7) can be satisfied for both (x0, y0) and (x0, z0)
only if |y0| = |z0|. Thus, an internal minimum point of f in D must satisfy at least one of the
conditions |x0| = |y0|, |x0| = |z0| or |y0| = |z0|. Assume, w.l.o.g., that |x0| = |y0|. If x0 = −y0,
then necessarily z0 = 1, and thus (x0, y0, z0) ∈ ∂(D). If x0 = y0, then z0 = 1− 2x0, and hence,
Inequality (6) is reduced to:
2x30 + (1− 2x0)3 ≥ 2x2k+10 + (1− 2x0)2k+1. (8)
Therefore, it is sufficient to prove Inequality (8) for all 0 ≤ x0 ≤ 1. Note that the inequality
holds trivially for x0 ≤ 1/2. Let g(t) = t3 − t2k+1, and denote δ = 1 − x. By Inequality (8), it
is sufficient to prove that for all 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1/2,
2g(1 − δ) ≥ g(1 − 2δ). (9)
We use the following two properties of g(t):
1. g(t) is nonnegative for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Furthermore, g is monotone increasing for 0 < t < t0
and monotone decreasing for t0 < t < 1, where t0 = (
3
2k+1 )
1/(2k−2).
2. g(t) is convex in the domain 0 < t < t1, and concave in the domain t1 < t < 1, where
t1 = (
6
2k(2k+1))
1/(2k−2).
Since g(1) = 0, Inequality (9) follows from the concavity of g whenever 1−2δ ≥ t1. Furthermore,
when 1−δ ≤ t0, the inequality follows immediately from the monotonicity and nonnegativity of
g in that domain. The only remaining case is when 1− 2δ < t1 and 1− δ > t0 (or equivalently,
(1 − t1)/2 < δ < 1 − t0. We note that this domain may be empty, and in this case we are
already done by the previous considerations). In this case, by the monotonicity properties of g
we have g(1 − δ) > g((1 + t1)/2) (since t0 < 1 − δ < (1 + t1)/2), and g(1 − 2δ) < g(t1) (since
1− 2δ < t1 < t0). Therefore,
2g(1 − δ)− g(1 − 2δ) > 2g((1 + t1)/2) − g(t1) ≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from the concavity of g(t) for t1 < t < 1. This completes the
proof. 
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Proof of Theorem 3.3. By assumption, the GSWF is neutral, and hence, balanced. There-
fore, by Theorem 3.1, the probability of irrational choice in our case is
W (f, g, h) = 1/4 + 〈〈f, g〉〉4α−1 + 〈〈g, h〉〉4β−1 + 〈〈h, f〉〉4γ−1.
Since the GSWF is neutral and symmetric, we have f = g = h, and all the Fourier-Walsh
coefficients of f on the even non-zero levels vanish (see [11], Proof of Theorem 5.1). Thus,
W (f, g, h) = 1/4+
∑
|S| odd
fˆ(S)2(4α−1)|S|+
∑
|S| odd
fˆ(S)2(4β−1)|S|+
∑
|S| odd
fˆ(S)2(4γ−1)|S| =
= 1/4 +
⌈n/2⌉−1∑
k=0
[
((4α − 1)2k+1 + (4β − 1)2k+1 + (4γ − 1)2k+1)
∑
|S|=2k+1
fˆ(S)2
]
=
= 1/4 −
∑
|S|=1
fˆ(S)2 +
⌈n/2⌉−1∑
k=1
((4α − 1)2k+1 + (4β − 1)2k+1 + (4γ − 1)2k+1)
∑
|S|=2k+1
fˆ(S)2,
where the last equality follows from the relation α+β+γ = 1/2. Since for every k the expression∑
|S|=2k+1 fˆ(S)
2 is non-negative, and since by Lemma 3.5, for all k ≥ 1,
(4α − 1)2k+1 + (4β − 1)2k+1 + (4γ − 1)2k+1 ≥ (4α − 1)3 + (4β − 1)3 + (4γ − 1)3,
it follows that
W (f, g, h) ≥ 1/4−
∑
|S|=1
fˆ(S)2 +
(
(4α− 1)3 + (4β − 1)3 + (4γ − 1)3) ∑
|S|>1
fˆ(S)2 =
= (1/4−
∑
|S|=1
fˆ(S)2)(1 + (4α − 1)3 + (4β − 1)3 + (4γ − 1)3),
where the last equality follows from the Parseval identity. Since amongst the symmetric neutral
functions, the expression
∑
|S|=1 fˆ(S)
2 is maximized for the majority function (see proof of
Theorem 5.1 in [11]), we get
W (f, g, h) ≥ (1
4
− dm)(1 + (4α − 1)3 + (4β − 1)3 + (4γ − 1)3),
and thus it is only left to show that
(4α− 1)3 + (4β − 1)3 + (4γ − 1)3 > −1. (10)
This claim is trivial for α, β, γ ≤ 1/4, since in that case
(4α− 1)3 + (4β − 1)3 + (4γ − 1)3 > (4α − 1) + (4β − 1) + (4γ − 1) = −1.
Hence, assume that γ > 1/4, and write γ = 1/2 − α − β (and thus 4γ − 1 = 1 − 4α − 4β).
Inequality (10) is equivalent to
(1− 4α)3 + (1− 4β)3 < 1 + (1− 4α− 4β)3,
that follows from the strict convexity of the function F (t) = t3 on [0, 1]. This completes the
proof of Theorem 3.3. 
The second result is a combination of Theorem 3.1 with the following proposition, which is
an easy consequence of the “Majority is stablest” theorem [16]:
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Proposition 3.6. Let 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and let ǫ > 0. There exists n0 = n0(ρ, ǫ) such that for all
n > n0, if f : {0, 1}n → [0, 1] is symmetric and balanced then
〈〈f, f〉〉ρ =
∑
S 6=∅
fˆ(S)2ρ|S| ≤ 1
2π
arcsin ρ+ ǫ.
Corollary 3.7. Consider a GSWF on three alternatives, where the distribution of the prefer-
ences is an even product distribution D(α, β, γ) with α, β, γ ≤ 1/4. Then for all ǫ > 0 there
exists n0 = n0(ǫ, α, β, γ) such that if the number of voters is n > n0 and the GSWF is neutral,
symmetric, and satisfies the IIA condition, then the probability of a rational choice is at most
p + ǫ, where p is the probability of a rational choice for the majority GSWF on n voters and
three alternatives.
Proof: Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.3, if α, β, γ ≤ 1/4 then
W (f, g, h) = 1/4+
∑
|S| odd
fˆ(S)2(4α−1)|S|+
∑
|S| odd
fˆ(S)2(4β−1)|S|+
∑
|S| odd
fˆ(S)2(4γ−1)|S| =
= 1/4 −
∑
|S| odd
fˆ(S)2|4α − 1||S| −
∑
|S| odd
fˆ(S)2|4β − 1||S| −
∑
|S| odd
fˆ(S)2|4γ − 1||S| =
= 1/4 − 〈〈f, f〉〉|4α−1| − 〈〈f, f〉〉|4β−1| − 〈〈f, f〉〉|4γ−1|.
Hence, by Proposition 3.6, for every ǫ > 0 there exists n0 = n0(ǫ, α, β, γ) such that for every
GSWF on n > n0 voters satisfying the assumptions of the corollary,
W (f, g, h) ≥ 1/4 − 1
2π
arcsin(|4α − 1|)− 1
2π
arcsin(|4β − 1|)− 1
2π
arcsin(|4γ − 1|)− ǫ.
Finally, since for the majority GSWF Fn on n voters we have, for all 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1,
lim
n→∞
〈〈Fn, Fn〉〉ρ = 1
2π
arcsin ρ
(see [16], Section 4), the assertion of the corollary follows. 
Remark 3.8. Corollary 3.7 is proved in [16] for a uniform distribution of the preferences, as
a corollary of the “Majority is Stablest” theorem.
Remark 3.9. Conjecture 8.1 of [11] asserts that for every distribution of the preferences (and
even for more than three alternatives), the probability of a rational choice for GSWFs that
are neutral, symmetric, and satisfy the IIA condition, is maximized for the majority function.
Hence, Corollary 3.7 proves in the asymptotic sense (i.e., for a sufficiently large n) a special
case of the conjecture.
We conclude this section by explaining the restriction on the distribution of the individual
preferences. The proof of Theorem 3.1 crucially depends on the fact that Fˆ i4({j}) vanishes for
j = 1, 2, 3. This condition holds if and only if the probabilities of the preferences satisfy the
following three equations:
Pr[1, 0, 0] +Pr[1, 1, 0] +Pr[1, 0, 1] −Pr[0, 1, 0] −Pr[0, 0, 1] −Pr[0, 1, 1] = 0,
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Pr[0, 1, 0] +Pr[1, 1, 0] +Pr[0, 1, 1] −Pr[1, 0, 0] −Pr[0, 0, 1] −Pr[1, 0, 1] = 0,
Pr[0, 0, 1] +Pr[1, 0, 1] +Pr[0, 1, 1] −Pr[1, 0, 0] −Pr[0, 1, 0] −Pr[1, 1, 0] = 0,
where Pr[a, b, c] is a shorthand for Pr[(xi, yi, zi) = (a, b, c)]. Summing the first two equations
we get
2Pr[1, 1, 0] − 2Pr[0, 0, 1] = 0,
and similarly by summing the two other pairs of equations we get Pr[1, 0, 1] = Pr[0, 1, 0] and
Pr[0, 1, 1] = Pr[1, 0, 0]. Finally, since all the probabilities sum up to one, we get Pr[1, 0, 0] +
Pr[0, 1, 0] + Pr[0, 0, 1] = 1/2, and this completes the restrictions described above. It is chal-
lenging to generalize Theorem 3.1 to more general distributions on the preferences, but the
expression
∑
S⊂{1,...,3n} Fˆ3(S)(Fˆ1(S) + Fˆ2(S)) seems hard to compute in the general case.
4 Lower Bounds on the Probability of Rational Choice
In this section we establish lower bounds on the probability of a rational choice for two classes
of GSWFs: monotone balanced functions and general balanced functions.
4.1 Monotone Balanced GSWFs
Definition 4.1. A function f : {0, 1}n → R is monotone increasing if for all x = (x1, . . . , xn)
and y = (y1, . . . , yn),
(∀i : xi ≤ yi)⇒ (f(x) ≤ f(y)).
Similarly, a function is monotone decreasing if
(∀i : xi ≤ yi)⇒ (f(x) ≥ f(y)).
Theorem 1.2 is a special case of the following, more general, result:
Theorem 4.2. Consider a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition where the
choice functions between the pairs of alternatives (A,B), (B,C), and (C,A), denoted by f, g,
and h, respectively, are monotone increasing. If the distribution of the preferences is an even
product distribution satisfying α, β, γ ≤ 1/4 (and in particular, if the preferences are uniformly
distributed) then the probability of irrational choice satisfies:
W (f, g, h) ≤ p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1 − p3), (11)
where p1, p2, and p3 are the expectations of f, g, and h, respectively.
Remark 4.3. The assertion of Theorem 4.2 is tight, as can be seen in the following example:
Assume that f depends only on the first voter, g depends only on the second voter, and h
depends only on the third voter. Then clearly, for all −1 ≤ δ ≤ 1,
〈〈f, g〉〉δ = 〈〈g, h〉〉δ = 〈〈h, f〉〉δ = 0,
and thus,
W (f, g, h) = p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1 − p3),
where p1, p2, and p3 are the expectations of f, g, and h, respectively.
By Theorem 3.1, the assertion of Theorem 4.2 is an immediate consequence of the following
proposition:
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Proposition 4.4. For any two monotone increasing Boolean functions f and g, and for every
−1 ≤ δ ≤ 1,
1
δ
〈〈f, g〉〉δ ≥ 0. (12)
The proof of Proposition 4.4 uses properties of the Bonamie-Beckner noise operator and the
FKG correlation inequality [7]. For the reader’s convenience, we recall the statement of the
FKG inequality in the special case of the uniform measure on the discrete cube.
Theorem 4.5 (Fortuin, Kasteleyn, and Ginibre). Consider the discrete cube {0, 1}n endowed
with the uniform measure µ, and let f, g : {0, 1}n → R. Then:
1. If both f and g are monotone increasing, then Eµ[fg] ≥ Eµ[f ]Eµ[g].
2. If f is monotone increasing and g is monotone decreasing, then Eµ[fg] ≤ Eµ[f ]Eµ[g].
Proof of Proposition 4.4. By the definition of the noise operator Tǫ, we have
1
δ
〈〈f, g〉〉δ = 1
δ
∑
S 6=∅
δ|S|fˆ(S)gˆ(S) =
1
δ
∑
S 6=∅
T̂δf(S)gˆ(S).
By the Parseval identity,
1
δ
∑
S 6=∅
T̂δf(S)gˆ(S) =
1
δ
(∑
S
T̂δf(S)gˆ(S)− T̂δf(∅)gˆ(∅)
)
=
1
δ
(Eµ[Tδf · g]− Eµ[Tδf ]Eµ[g]).
Hence, Inequality (12) is equivalent to the inequality:
1
δ
(Eµ[Tδf · g]− Eµ[Tδf ]Eµ[g]) ≥ 0. (13)
Since the function g is monotone increasing, Inequality (13) will follow from the FKG inequality,
once we show that Tδf is monotone increasing if 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, and monotone decreasing if
−1 ≤ δ ≤ 0. We show the case of −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0 (the case of positive δ is similar).
Without loss of generality, it is sufficient to prove that for all (x2, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n−1,
Tδf(0, x2, . . . , xn) ≥ Tδf(1, x2, . . . , xn). (14)
Using the equivalent definition of the noise operator presented in Section 2.2 (i.e., Equation (2)),
Tδf(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = E[f((x1, x2, . . . , xn)⊕ (y1, . . . , yn))],
where each yi is distributed according to the distribution Pr[yi = 0] = (1 + δ)/2,Pr[yi = 1] =
(1−δ)/2, independently of other yi’s. Thus, we have to show that for all (x2, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n−1,
E[f((y1, x2 ⊕ y2, . . . , xn ⊕ yn))] ≥ E[f((1⊕ y1, x2 ⊕ y2, . . . , xn ⊕ yn))].
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that for each (z2, . . . , zn) ∈ {0, 1}n−1,
Ey1 [f((y1, z2, . . . , zn))] ≥ Ey1 [f((1⊕ y1, z2, . . . , zn))],
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or equivalently
1 + δ
2
f(0, z2, . . . , zn) +
1− δ
2
f(1, z2, . . . , zn) ≥ 1− δ
2
f(0, z2, . . . , zn) +
1 + δ
2
f(1, z2, . . . , zn).
This inequality indeed follows from the monotonicity of f , since δ ≤ 0. This completes the
proof of Proposition 4.4. 
For a general even product distribution of the preferences, the probability of a rational choice
for balanced monotone choice functions can be as low as 1/2 (compared to 3/4 in the case
α, β, γ ≤ 1/4). An example in which the probability is 1/2 is the following:
Example Assume that the distribution on the preferences is: Pr[(xi, yi, zi) = (1, 1, 0)] = 1/2
and Pr[(xi, yi, zi) = (0, 0, 1)] = 1/2, while the probability of the other preferences is zero (i.e.,
α = 1/2 and β = γ = 0). The choice functions f and g are a dictatorship of the first voter, and
h is a dictatorship of the second voter. Then it is easy to see that W (f, g, h) = 1/2.
It can be shown that 1/2 is a lower bound for the probability of a rational choice in our case.
Indeed, by Theorem 3.1, for balanced choice functions we have
W (f, g, h) = 1/4 + 〈〈f, g〉〉4α−1 + 〈〈g, h〉〉4β−1 + 〈〈h, f〉〉4γ−1. (15)
By Proposition 4.4, an expression of the form 〈〈f, g〉〉4α−1 can be positive only if α > 1/4. Since
in our distribution α + β + γ = 1/2, at most one of the expressions of this form appearing in
Equation (15) is positive. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
〈〈f, g〉〉4α−1 =
∑
S 6=∅
fˆ(S)gˆ(S)(4α − 1)|S| ≤ 1/4,
and similarly for β and γ. Therefore, W (f, g, h) ≤ 1/4 + (1/4 + 0 + 0) = 1/2.
The probability of a rational choice is equal to 1/2 if and only if 〈〈f, g〉〉4α−1 = 1/4, and
〈〈g, h〉〉4β−1 = 〈〈h, f〉〉4γ−1 = 0 (up to a permutation between α, β, and γ). By the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality, this occurs if and only if the following three conditions are satisfied:
• The distribution of the preferences is α = 1/2, β = γ = 0.
• The choice functions f, g satisfy f = g.
• The choice function h is independent of f , in the following sense: The set of voters
{1, . . . , n} can be partitioned into two disjoint sets A and B such that the output of f
depends only on the elements of A, and the output of h depends only on the elements of
B.
4.2 General Balanced GSWFs
In [11] it is stated (Proposition 5.2) that if the preferences are uniformly distributed, then the
lower bound for the probability of rational choice for general balanced GSWFs is 2/3. However,
the proof sketched in [11] is insufficient4, and it is not even clear that the lower bound itself is
correct. In this subsection we prove a weaker lower bound, and discuss its tightness.
4The proof in [11] assumes implicitly that the least possible probability is achieved when the Fourier-Walsh
coefficients of the functions f, g, h are concentrated on the second level. It is not clear whether this assumption
is correct.
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Theorem 4.6. Consider a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition such that
the choice functions between the pairs of alternatives are balanced. If the preferences are uni-
formly distributed then the probability of a rational choice is at least 5/8.
Proof: Consider the Fourier-Walsh expansions of the choice functions f, g, and h. Let
n∑
i=1
fˆ({i})2 = a,
n∑
i=1
gˆ({i})2 = b,
n∑
i=1
hˆ({i})2 = c.
Since f, g, and h are balanced, then by the Parseval identity∑
|S|>1
fˆ(S)2 = 1/4− a,
∑
|S|>1
gˆ(S)2 = 1/4 − b,
∑
|S|>1
hˆ(S)2 = 1/4 − c.
Recall that by Theorem 3.1, in our case
W (f, g, h) = 1/4 + 〈〈f, g〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈g, h〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈h, f〉〉−1/3. (16)
We have
〈〈f, g〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈g, h〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈h, f〉〉−1/3 =
∑
|S|>0
(
fˆ(S)gˆ(S) + gˆ(S)hˆ(S) + hˆ(S)fˆ(S)
)
(−1/3)|S| =
= −1
3
∑
|S|=1
(
fˆ(S)gˆ(S)+gˆ(S)hˆ(S)+hˆ(S)fˆ(S)
)
+
∑
|S|>1
(
fˆ(S)gˆ(S)+gˆ(S)hˆ(S)+hˆ(S)fˆ(S)
)
(−1/3)|S| ≤
≤ −1
3
∑
|S|=1
(
fˆ(S)gˆ(S) + gˆ(S)hˆ(S) + hˆ(S)fˆ(S)
)
+
1
9
∑
|S|>1
∣∣∣fˆ(S)gˆ(S) + gˆ(S)hˆ(S) + hˆ(S)fˆ(S)∣∣∣.
In order to bound the first summand, we use the elementary inequality
−(xy + yz + xz) ≤ (x2 + y2 + z2)/2.
We get
−1
3
∑
|S|=1
(
fˆ(S)gˆ(S)+gˆ(S)hˆ(S)+hˆ(S)fˆ(S)
)
= −1
3
n∑
i=1
(
fˆ({i})gˆ({i})+gˆ({i})hˆ({i})+hˆ({i})fˆ ({i})
)
≤
≤ 1
6
n∑
i=1
(
fˆ({i})2 + gˆ({i})2 + hˆ({i})2
)
=
a+ b+ c
6
.
In order to bound the second summand, we use the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the inequal-
ity between the arithmetic and the geometric means. Let
f˜ =
∑
|S|>1
|fˆ(S)|rS , g˜ =
∑
|S|>1
|gˆ(S)|rS .
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the Parseval identity we get∑
|S|>1
|fˆ(S)gˆ(S)| = 〈f˜ , g˜〉 ≤ ||f˜ ||2||g˜||2 =
√
(1/4 − a)(1/4 − b) ≤ 1/4 − (a+ b)/2,
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where the last inequality follows from the inequality between the arithmetic and the geometric
means. Applying the same inequalities to the pairs (g, h) and (h, f), we get
1
9
∑
|S|>1
∣∣∣fˆ(S)gˆ(S) + gˆ(S)hˆ(S) + hˆ(S)fˆ(S)∣∣∣ ≤
≤ 1
9
(1
4
− a+ b
2
+
1
4
− b+ c
2
+
1
4
− c+ a
2
)
=
1
12
− a+ b+ c
9
.
Combining the bounds obtained above, we get
−1
3
∑
|S|=1
(
fˆ(S)gˆ(S) + gˆ(S)hˆ(S) + hˆ(S)fˆ(S)
)
+
1
9
∑
|S|>1
∣∣∣fˆ(S)gˆ(S) + gˆ(S)hˆ(S) + hˆ(S)fˆ(S)∣∣∣ ≤
≤ a+ b+ c
6
+
1
12
− a+ b+ c
9
=
1
12
+
a+ b+ c
18
.
Substitution to Equation (16) yields:
W (f, g, h) ≤ 1/4 + 1/12 + (a+ b+ c)/18 = 1/3 + (a+ b+ c)/18.
Finally, since by the Parseval identity we have 0 ≤ a, b, c ≤ 1/4, the maximum in the right hand
side is obtained for a = b = c = 1/4, and thus,
W (f, g, h) ≤ 1/3 + (3/4)/18 = 3/8,
as asserted. 
The tightness of the lower bound in Theorem 4.6 is not clear to us. The example presented
in [11] yields the value W (f, g, h) = 1/3, where all the Fourier-Walsh coefficients of f, g, and h
are concentrated on the second level. Another example yielding the same value of W (f, g, h) is
f(x1, . . . , xn) = xi, g(x1, . . . , xn) = xi, h(x1, . . . , xn) = 1− xi,
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In this example, all the weight of f, g, and h is concentrated on the first
level. It seems possible that the correct lower bound is 2/3, as asserted in [11]. However, in
order to prove this bound, one has to exploit the fact that the choice functions are Boolean, as
can be seen in the following example:
Example Let f, g, h be defined by fˆ(∅) = gˆ(∅) = hˆ(∅) = 1/2 and
fˆ(i) =
2
2
√
6
, fˆ(j) = − 1
2
√
6
, fˆ(k) = − 1
2
√
6
,
gˆ(i) = − 1
2
√
6
, gˆ(j) =
2
2
√
6
, gˆ(k) = − 1
2
√
6
,
hˆ(i) = − 1
2
√
6
, hˆ(j) = − 1
2
√
6
, hˆ(k) =
2
2
√
6
,
for 1 ≤ i < j < k ≤ n. The rest of the Fourier-Walsh coefficients of f, g, and h are zero. Since∑
S 6=∅
fˆ(S)2 =
∑
S 6=∅
gˆ(S)2 =
∑
S 6=∅
hˆ(S)2 = 1/4,
the functions f, g, and h “look like” balanced functions from the Fourier-theoretic point of view.
Nevertheless, W (f, g, h) = 3/8, which agrees with the lower bound of Theorem 4.6. This shows
that in order to improve Theorem 4.6, we have to use the fact that f, g, and h are Boolean
functions.
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5 Upper Bounds on the Probability of Rational Choice
Throughout this section we assume that the preferences are uniformly distributed.
In this section we discuss Kalai’s [11] proof of Arrow’s Impossibility theorem for neutral GSWFs
on three alternatives. First we discuss the possibility of extending Kalai’s proof to other special
cases of Arrow’s theorem, and then we discuss the stability version of the theorem proved by
Kalai (for neutral GSWFs).
5.1 Extending Kalai’s Proof to Other Special Cases of Arrow’s Theorem
Kalai’s proof uses the Fourier-theoretic formula for the probability of irrational choice for
GSWFs on three altrenatives satisfying the IIA condition (Theorem 3.1). For a balanced
GSWF, the formula reads:
W (f, g, h) = 1/4 + 〈〈f, g〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈g, h〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈h, f〉〉−1/3. (17)
Define
f˜ =
∑
S 6=∅
fˆ(S)rS , g =
∑
S 6=∅
gˆ(S)(−1/3)|S|rS .
Note that since f and g are balanced, by the Parseval identity ||f˜ ||2 = 1/2 and ||g||2 ≤ 1/6.
Therefore, by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
|〈〈f, g〉〉−1/3| = |〈f˜ , g〉| ≤ ||f˜ ||2||g||2 ≤ 1/12,
and it can be shown that equality can hold only if all the Fourier-Walsh coefficients of f and
of g are on the first level. Then, it can be further shown that W (f, g, h) = 0 can hold only if
f, g, and h are dictatorships of the same voter, and this completes the proof of the theorem.
It was suggested in [11] to use the same reasoning in the non-balanced case. Such gener-
alization is possible if p1, p2, and p3, the expectations of f, g, and h, satisfy some condition
described in [11]. However, this condition is not satisfied in many cases, e.g., for p1 = p2 = 1/5
and p3 = 1, as noted in [11]. Kalai [12] suggested to improve the upper bound ||g||2 ≤ 1/6
(or, more generally, ||g||2 ≤
√
p2(1− p2)/3) used in the proof by using the Bonamie-Beckner
hypercontractive inequality [4, 2].
We show by an example that this proof strategy, even using the hypercontractive inequality,
cannot lead to a complete proof of Arrow’s theorem. The example shows that if the biased inner
product 〈〈f, g〉〉−1/3 is replaced by
〈〈f, g〉〉′−1/3 = −
∑
S 6=∅
|fˆ(S)gˆ(S)(−1/3)|S||,
then there exist functions f, g, h such that
W ′(f, g, h) = p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3) + 〈〈f, g〉〉′−1/3 + 〈〈g, h〉〉′−1/3 + 〈〈h, f〉〉′−1/3 < 0.
Hence, a proof of Arrow’s theorem using Equation (17) cannot ignore the sign of the Fourier-
Walsh coefficients of the choice functions.
The example uses the notion of a dual function:
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Definition 5.1. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. The dual function of f (which we denote by f ′ :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}), is defined by
f ′(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 1− f(1− x1, 1− x2, . . . , 1− xn).
The Fourier-Walsh expansion of the dual function is closely related to the expansion of the
original function:
Claim 5.2. Consider the Fourier-Walsh expansions of a Boolean function f and its dual func-
tion f ′. For all S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with |S| ≥ 1,
fˆ ′(S) = (−1)|S|−1fˆ(S).
The simple proof of the claim is omitted.
Example Assume that n is odd, f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = x1 · x2 · . . . · xn is the AND function,
g = f ′ is its dual function, and h is the majority function. We have
p1 = E[f ] = 2
−n, p2 = E[g] = 1− 2−n, p3 = E[h] = 1/2.
The Fourier-Walsh coefficients of f satisfy |fˆ(S)| = 2−n for all S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}. The first-level
Fourier-Walsh coefficients of the majority function are
hˆ({i}) =
(
n− 1
(n− 1)/2
)
2−n ≈
√
1
2πn
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence,
〈〈h, f〉〉′−1/3 ≤ −
1
3
n∑
i=1
|hˆ({i})fˆ ({i})| ≈ −1
3
n2−n
√
1
2πn
= − 1
3
√
2π
√
n2−n.
Therefore,
W ′(f, g, h) ≤ p1p2p3+(1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3)+ 〈〈h, f〉〉′−1/3 ≤ 2−n(1− 2−n)−
1
3
√
2
√
n2−n < 0,
for n large enough.
A possible step towards a Fourier-theoretic proof of Arrow’s theorem in the general case is
the following lower bound on the biased inner product 〈〈f, g〉〉δ :
Proposition 5.3. Let f, g : {0, 1}n → R+ be non-negative functions with E[f ] = p1 and
E[g] = p2, and let −1 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Then
〈〈f, g〉〉δ ≥ −p1p2,
and equality holds if and only if either f ≡ 0 or g ≡ 0.
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Proof: We prove the proposition in the case δ < 0, the case δ ≥ 0 is similar. Let f ′′(x1, . . . , xn) =
f(1− x1, . . . , 1− xn). Clearly, fˆ ′′(∅) = E[f ′′] = p1. By Claim 5.2, for all S 6= ∅,
fˆ ′′(S) = (−1)|S|fˆ(S).
Hence, by the definition of the Bonamie-Beckner noise operator,
T̂−δf ′′(S) = (−δ)|S|(−1)|S|fˆ(S) = δ|S|fˆ(S).
Therefore, by the Parseval identity,
〈〈f, g〉〉δ + p1p2 =
∑
S 6=∅
fˆ(S)gˆ(S)δ|S| + p1p2 =
∑
S 6=∅
T̂−δf ′′(S)gˆ(S) + T̂−δf ′′(∅)gˆ(∅) = 〈T−δf ′′, g〉.
Finally, by the assumption g is non-negative, and by Equation (2), the function T−δf
′′ is strictly
positive, unless f ≡ 0. Hence,
〈T−δf ′′, g〉 = 1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
T−δf
′′(x)g(x) > 0,
unless either f ≡ 0 or g ≡ 0, and in that cases 〈T−δf ′′, g〉 = 0. This completes the proof of the
proposition. 
Corollary 5.4. The assertion of Arrow’s theorem holds if p1 + p2 + p3 ≤ 1, where p1, p2, and
p3 are the expectations of the choice functions f, g, and h.
Proof: By Proposition 5.3,
〈〈f, g〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈g, h〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈h, f〉〉−1/3 > −(p1p2 + p2p3 + p3p1).
(Equality cannot hold since by the assumption of Arrow’s theorem, f, g, and h are non-constant).
Hence, by Equation (3),
W (f, g, h) > p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1 − p2)(1− p3)− (p1p2 + p2p3 + p3p1) = 1− p1 − p2 − p3 ≥ 0,
and thus the assertion of Arrow’s theorem holds. 
Another corollary of Proposition 5.3 uses dual functions:
Corollary 5.5. Let f, g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such that E[f ] = p1 and E[g] = p2, and let −1 ≤ δ ≤
1. Then
〈〈f, g〉〉δ ≥ −(1− p1)(1− p2),
and equality holds if and only if either f ≡ 1 or g ≡ 1.
Proof: Denote the dual functions of f and g by f ′ and g′, respectively. By Claim 5.2, for all
S 6= ∅,
fˆ ′(S)gˆ′(S) = (−1)|S|−1fˆ(S)(−1)|S|−1gˆ(S) = fˆ(S)gˆ(S),
and hence
〈〈f ′, g′〉〉δ = 〈〈f, g〉〉δ .
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The functions f ′, g′ are non-negative and satisfy E[f ′] = 1 − p1 and E[g′] = 1 − p2. Thus, by
Proposition 5.3,
〈〈f ′, g′〉〉δ ≥ −(1− p1)(1− p2),
and equality holds if and only if f ′ ≡ 0 or g′ ≡ 0, or equivalently, if and only if f ≡ 1 or g ≡ 1.

Proposition 5.3 and Corollary 5.5 yield an immediate proof of Arrow’s theorem in the case
where there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 such that pi = 0 or pi = 1. Indeed, two of the biased inner
products of the form 〈〈f, g〉〉δ appearing in Equation (3) vanish, and the third biased inner
product can be bounded using either Proposition 5.3 or Corollary 5.5. This settles the example
given in [11]. However, we note that this case is anyway ruled out by the assumption (made in
Arrow’s theorem) that the choice functions are non-constant.
It seems possible that Kalai’s proof and Proposition 5.3 can be extended to a proof of
broader special cases of Arrow’s theorem. Such extension is of interest even after the recent
analytic proof of Arrow’s theorem (in the general case) by Mossel [18], since in the cases where
Kalai’s proof applies, the same argument yields a stability version of the theorem in which the
dependence of δ(ǫ) on ǫ is linear, while the dependence in Mossel’s theorem is much weaker.
5.2 Discussion on a Stability Version of Arrow’s Theorem
In [11], Kalai proved a stability version of Arrow’s theorem:
Theorem 5.6 ([11]). For every ǫ > 0 and for every balanced GSWF on three alternatives, if
the probability that the social choice is irrational is smaller than ǫ then there is a dictator such
that the probability that the output of the GSWF differs from the dictator’s choice is smaller
than K · ǫ, where K is a universal constant.
Following Theorem 5.6, it is natural to ask:
Question 5.7. Amongst the GSWFs on three alternatives satisfying the assumptions of Arrow’s
theorem, which is the “most rational” one (i.e., the one having the highest probability of a
rational outcome)?
Remark 5.8. The idea behind the question is similar to the idea behind the Hilton-Milner
theorem [10] concerning intersecting families. A family of subsets of a given finite set is called
intersecting if the intersection of any two elements of the family is non-empty. The Erdo¨s-Ko-
Rado theorem [6] asserts that an intersecting family of k-element subsets of an n-element set has
at most
(n−1
k−1
)
elements, and that the only maximal families are of the form {S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} :
|S| = k, i ∈ S}, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The Hilton-Milner theorem [10] answers the question: What is
the second largest intersecting family?
Similarly, in our situation, Arrow’s theorem asserts that under some conditions, the only
“most rational” GSWFs are the dictatorship functions. Question 5.7 asks, what is the most
rational GSWF except for the dictatorship functions.
One class of natural candidates for being the most rational GSWF is functions close to a
dictatorship. Since the probability that the output of the GSWF differs from a dictatorship is
at least 2−n, Theorem 5.6 implies that for every balanced function of this class, the probability
of irrational choice is at least K−1 · 2−n, where K is a universal constant.
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Another class of natural candidates is almost constant functions. It can be shown that if
all the three choice functions are almost constant (e.g., f(x1, . . . , xn) = 1 unless (x1, . . . , xn) =
(0, 0, . . . , 0)) then the probability of irrational choice is also Θ(2−n).
However, it appears that there exists a GSWF with a much lower probability of irrational
outcome:
Example Assume that n is odd, f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = x1 · x2 · . . . · xn is the AND function,
g = f ′ is its dual function, and h is the majority function. Let
p1 = E[f ] = 2
−n, p2 = E[g] = 1− 2−n, p3 = E[h] = 1/2.
By the proof of Proposition 5.3,
〈〈f, g〉〉−1/3 = 〈T1/3f ′′, g〉 − p1p2.
By Equation (2),
〈T1/3f ′′, g〉 = 2−n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(1
3
)Pn
i=1
xi(2
3
)n−Pn
i=1
xi
g(x) = 2−n(1−
(2
3
)n
),
and thus,
〈〈f, g〉〉−1/3 = 2−n(1− (2/3)n)− 2−n(1− 2−n) = −(1/3)n + (1/4)n.
Similarly,
〈T1/3f ′′, h〉 = 2−n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(1
3
)Pn
i=1
xi(2
3
)n−Pn
i=1
xi
h(x) =
= 2−n
∑
{x:
P
n
i=1
xi>n/2}
(1
3
)Pn
i=1
xi(2
3
)n−Pn
i=1
xi ≤ 2−n
∑
{x:
P
n
i=1
xi>n/2}
(1
3
)n/2(2
3
)n/2
=
=
1
2
(2
9
)n/2 ≈ 1
2
· 0.471n.
Hence,
〈〈f, h〉〉−1/3 ≤
1
2
· 0.471n − 1
2
· 2−n.
Finally, since the dual function of f is g and since h is self-dual,
〈〈g, h〉〉−1/3 = 〈〈f, h〉〉−1/3.
Therefore,
W (f, g, h) = p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1 − p3) + 〈〈f, g〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈g, h〉〉−1/3 + 〈〈h, f〉〉−1/3 ≤
≤ 2−n(1− 2−n) + 0.471n − 2−n − (1/3)n + (1/4)n ≤ 0.471n.
We conjecture that the GSWF in the example is the most rational GSWF under the condi-
tions of Arrow’s theorem, but we weren’t able to prove this conjecture.
The example can be generalized to a series of examples that proves Theorem 1.3.
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Example For 0 < q < 1/2, for any K > 0, and for an odd n, let
f(x) =
{
1,
∑n
i=1 xi ≥ (1− q)n
0,
∑n
i=1 xi < (1− q)n,
g is the dual function of f , and h is the majority function. We use the well-known (see, for
example, [14], Lemma 9.2) inequality:
2nH(q)
n+ 1
≤
(
n
qn
)
≤ 2nH(q), (18)
where H(q) = −q log2 q − (1 − q) log2(1 − q) is the value of the entropy function at q. By
Inequality (18), we have
min(E[f ],E[g],E[h]) ≥ 2
nH(q)−1
n+ 1
.
Hence, amongst any pair of alternatives, the probability of each alternative to be preferred by
the society over the other alternative is at least η = 2nH(q)−1/(n+1). On the other hand, using
considerations similar to those of the previous example (but more tedious), one obtains
W (f, g, h) ≤ 2n(H(q)−1)(1− 2n(H(q)−1)) + 2n(q−1.08) − 2n(H(q)−1) < 2n(q−1.08).
Since for all q < 1/2,
q − 1.08 < H(q)− 1,
for n = n(q,K) big enough we have
W (f, g, h) < 2n(q−1.08) <
2n(H(q)−1)
(n+ 1)K
=
η
K
.
Therefore, substituting ǫ = 1−H(q), the assertion of Theorem 1.3 follows.5
We conclude the paper with an open question:
Question 5.9. Is this true that for small values of ǫ, the GSWF on three alternatives in which
the choice functions are threshold functions with expectations ǫ, 1/2, and 1− ǫ (i.e., the GSWF
presented in the example above) has the highest probability of rational choice amongst all non-
dictatorial GSWFs satisfying the IIA condition which are ǫ-far from not having all orderings of
the alternatives in their range?
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